DailyTickers

TBLA — Taboola.com Ltd.

NasdaqGS · Communication Services · 6 août 2026
$3.89 +1.43% Post-earnings Value trap risk Net cash Score 42 C+
$1.06B
Market Cap
3.27M
Volume
5.7x
Fwd P/E
1.517
Beta
$2.835 – $5.71
52W Range
6.46%
Short Interest
0%
Div Yield
TBLA Chart
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Verdict Express

C+ Neutral High confidence on the earnings quality, low confidence on the 2027 revenue line

Two numbers do the work here. Taboola's trailing price/earnings ratio is 9.97, and its first-quarter GAAP net income was $59.1M, of which $77M came from a legal settlement where the company was the plaintiff. The settlement was larger than the entire quarterly profit it sat inside. Strip it out and the cheap trailing multiple stops existing. The forward multiple of 5.70 is computed against management's own non-GAAP net income guidance of $168M to $176M, a figure that excludes share-based compensation in a year when four executives received 5,536,181 shares in a single February grant. Meanwhile the second quarter produced $4.3M of GAAP net income on $476.8M of revenue, and $0.01 per share against $0.04 expected. So no, this is not a profitable company trading at five times earnings. It is a company whose reported profitability has been flattered, now guiding revenue to shrink 6.1% year over year in the third quarter because Google reclassified one of its products as spam. The discount is deserved. What is not deserved is the assumption that the business is broken: on the 10-Q figures Taboola holds $133.1M of cash against $72.0M drawn on a revolver, roughly $61M of net cash, with no shelf offering, no equity line and no warrants in 180 days.

Why Buy

  • Recomputed at today's price, enterprise value lands near $1.00B to $1.06B against full-year adjusted EBITDA guidance of $228M to $240M. That is 4.3x to 4.5x, and the guidance was raised, not cut.
  • The balance sheet carries roughly $61M of net cash on the 10-Q figures, $133.1M against a $72.0M revolver draw. The last S-3 registration dates from February 2024. No equity line, no warrants, no convertible in the last 180 days, which is unusual for a $4 stock.
  • The buyback is real money, not an announcement: $41.5M of ordinary and non-voting ordinary shares repurchased in the second quarter alone, $64.2M across the first half.
  • Ex-TAC gross profit grew 11.8% to $192.4M and adjusted EBITDA grew 22.8% to $55.5M while revenue grew 2.4%. The margin structure genuinely improved even as the top line stalled.

Why Avoid

  • Third-quarter revenue guidance of $460M to $473M sits 10% below the $518.1M consensus and represents a 6.1% year-over-year decline. The full-year guide fell to $1.930B–$1.956B from $2.03B.
  • Google designated back-button interception a spam violation on 13 April 2026 and began enforcing it on 15 June. That killed Explore More, a session-depth product Taboola had sold to publishers for years, at a cost of more than $20M of ex-TAC gross profit in the second half. The policy is enforced and the product is not coming back.
  • Free cash flow fell 49.3% to $17.3M in the quarter while the company spent $41.5M buying its own shares. Repurchases ran at roughly 2.4x the cash the business generated, funded from the balance sheet.
  • Apollo Management Holdings GP, a 10% owner, sold 12,000,000 shares at $4.40 on 28 May, ten weeks before the print and 13% above today's price. Zero insider purchases in 180 days.
  • Short interest more than doubled between February and July, from 4,036,802 shares (2.95% of float) to 8,839,134 (6.46%). The positioning was in place before the fall.

Business Overview

Taboola runs the recommendation widgets that sit under news articles on the open web, the boxes captioned Around the Web or You May Also Like. Publishers install the code, Taboola fills the slots with sponsored links, and the two sides split the money. The share paid away to publishers is traffic acquisition cost, which is why the company reports ex-TAC gross profit rather than revenue as its preferred measure. Incorporated in 2006, headquartered in New York, roughly 2,000 employees, classified by the exchange under Internet Content & Information.

That structure explains most of what happened on 5 August. Revenue is the gross number before publishers are paid, so it moves with the volume of inventory Taboola controls. Ex-TAC gross profit moves with the economics of each impression. In the second quarter those two lines separated: revenue grew 2.4% to $476.8M while ex-TAC gross profit grew 11.8% to $192.4M. Management chose the second number for the headline of its press release, which read Raises Full-Year ex-TAC Gross Profit and Adjusted EBITDA Guidance. Both raises were real. In the same document, full-year revenue guidance was cut by up to $110M against consensus.

The company is also in the middle of deliberately shrinking itself. It exited publisher relationships that did not meet its standards for advertiser results, more aggressively in the second quarter than before, and wrote off $12.169M of publisher prepayments as a non-cash charge. Management expects the purge to depress 2026 revenue and improve results later. That is a defensible strategy and an unfalsifiable one, at least until the numbers arrive.

Where the numbers disagree, and which one this page uses

Three figures did not reconcile across sources during this review, and readers should know which version they are getting. First, enterprise value. The market data feed reports $1,419,862,400. Rebuild it from its parts at today's price and you get $1,063,231,744 of market capitalisation plus $151,584,000 of debt less $150,275,008 of cash, or $1,064,540,736. The $355M gap is not a rounding issue: back out the market capitalisation implied by the published figure and it corresponds to a share price near $5.19, which is essentially the $5.2899 close of 4 August. The published enterprise value still reflects the pre-crash price. The same feed's price-to-book ratio of 1.53 corroborates it: against a stated book value of $3.497 that implies a $5.345 share price, when the stock is $3.89 and the honest ratio is 1.11. Every multiple on this page is recomputed at spot, which is why you see 4.3x to 4.5x rather than the 10.5x the feed reports.

Second, cash and debt. The feed reports $150.3M of cash and $151.6M of debt, implying net debt of roughly zero. The 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June reports $133.1M of cash and $72.0M drawn on a revolving credit facility, implying about $61M of net cash. The likeliest explanation for the debt gap is that the feed capitalises operating leases. This page uses the filing figures and shows both. Third, share count. Reported shares outstanding of 243,284,708 multiplied by $3.89 gives $946M, not the $1.063B market capitalisation quoted, which implies roughly 273M shares. Taboola has both ordinary and non-voting ordinary shares, and repurchases cover both, so the ordinary count understates the total. Ranges are used rather than false precision.

One more, smaller: the feed reports short interest at 5.64% of float, but 8,839,134 shares against its own stated float of 136,848,037 is 6.46%. The arithmetic wins. And a wire story published before the open on 5 August described the stock as down 9.5% to $4.79; the settled session closed at $3.835 from $5.2899, a fall of 27.5%. The daily bars are the record used here.

Segments

SegmentRevenue% TotalDescription
Ex-TAC gross profit$192.4M (Q2)40%Revenue net of what publishers are paid. Grew 11.8% year over year, the metric management guides on.
Traffic acquisition cost$284.4M (Q2)60%The publisher share of revenue, derived as revenue less ex-TAC gross profit. Roughly 60 cents of every revenue dollar.

Fundamentals

MetricValueSignal
Revenue (Q2 2026)$476.8M+2.4% YoY, missed by 4.5%
Revenue guidance (Q3)$460–473M-6.1% YoY
Revenue guidance (FY26)$1.930–1.956BCut from $2.03B
Ex-TAC gross profit (Q2)$192.4M+11.8% YoY
Adjusted EBITDA (Q2)$55.5M+22.8% YoY
GAAP net income (Q2)$4.3M$0.01/share vs $0.04 expected
Q1 2026 GAAP net income$59.1MIncludes $77M one-off
Operating cash flow (Q2)$31.3M-34.1% YoY
Free cash flow (Q2)$17.3M-49.3% YoY
Cash (30 June 2026)$133.1M10-Q figure
Total debt$72.0MRevolver draw
Net cash≈ $61MRecomputed
Enterprise value (recomputed)$1.00–1.06BNot $1.42B
EV / adj. EBITDA (FY26 guide)4.3–4.5xRecomputed at spot
Book value per share$3.497P/B 1.11x at spot
Buyback (H1 2026)$64.2MOrdinary + non-voting

Earnings History

QuarterEPS ActualEPS Est.SurpriseRevenue
Q2 2025$0.10$0.08+15.6%-
Q3 2025$0.11$0.09+24.6%-
Q4 2025$0.27$0.18+50.3%-
Q1 2026$0.06$0.04+70.0%-
Q2 2026$0.01$0.04-75%$476.8M

Four consecutive beats, then a miss. The streak ended on 5 August with $0.01 against $0.04 expected on a GAAP basis, and revenue 4.5% short. — Next: 4 November 2026

Insiders & Institutions

N/A
Insider Own.
N/A
Institution Own.

Recent Transactions

DateInsiderTypeSharesValue
2026-05-28Apollo Management Holdings GP (10% owner)sell12,000,000$52.8M at $4.40
2026-05-08Monica Mijaleski (Director)sell61,000$307,440 at $5.04
2026-05-07Kristy Sundjaja (Chief People Officer)sell40,878$204,390 at $5.00
2026-02-27Singolda, Walker, Maniv, Sundjajagrant5,536,181$19.0M at $3.44

Zero open-market purchases in 180 days. The only figure that matters is Apollo's: 12,000,000 shares at $4.40 on 28 May, leaving 18,039,644 held, ten weeks ahead of a print that took the stock 27.5% lower in a session. Note that the aggregate insider feed lists this sale twice; the identical post-transaction holding on both lines confirms one transaction, not two. Everything else in the window is either a share award, an option exercise or tax withholding, none of which are purchases or sales of conviction.

Capital Structure & Dilution

low
Dilution Risk

Share count is falling, not rising. $64.2M of repurchases in the first half, roughly 14M shares at prevailing prices, partly offset by the 5,536,181-share executive grant in February. The last S-3 registration statement was filed on 28 February 2024.

Short Interest

6.46% of float (8,839,134 shares, 15 July settlement)
SI % Float
2.9
Days to Cover
N/A
CTB

More than doubled in five months, from 4,036,802 shares and 2.95% of float on 13 February

Options / Derivatives

1,088
Call OI
228
Put OI
4.77
C/P Ratio
$5.00 (21 August expiry)
Max Pain
N/A
IV Mean

Unusual Activity: Implied volatility of 144% on the $5 call and 172% on the $7.50 call, against open interest of 511 and 575 contracts. Read nothing into the 4.77 call/put ratio: with 1,316 contracts of total open interest across the expiry, this book is too thin to carry information. Anyone citing it as bullish positioning is quoting noise.

Technical Analysis

RSI (14)29.3
EMA 20$4.89
EMA 50$4.86
EMA 200$4.23
MACD-0.157
Signal-0.021
ATR (14)$0.32
Below all EMAs RSI oversold MACD bearish Trend broken
Supports: $3.52 / $2.83
Resistances: $4.12 / $4.86 / $5.29

Technical Setup

The trend broke in one session. On 4 August the stock closed at $5.2899; on 5 August it closed at $3.835 on 9,255,600 shares, a 27.5% fall on roughly three times the following day's volume. Price now sits 20.5% below its 20-day exponential average at $4.892, with the 50-day at $4.8617 stacked within six-tenths of a percent of it. That cluster is overhead resistance now, and it is a long way overhead. The relative strength index at 29.3 is oversold, which in a trend this damaged means very little on its own: oversold readings mark exhaustion in uptrends and merely describe the damage in downtrends. What matters more is the empty space beneath. The 5 August low at $3.5199 is the only tested floor between here and the 52-week low at $2.835, and the average true range of $0.3206 is 8.2% of the share price, so a single ordinary session covers most of the distance to that floor.

Macro Context

IndicatorValueSignal
Market regimeRisk-on, 54.1% confidenceSupportive but not decisive
5-day transition to risk-off16.9% early risk-off, 8.0% crisisA quarter of the distribution is defensive
August seasonality (5y)-0.19% average daily returnMildly negative
Analyst mean target$5.79Stale — no upgrades or downgrades recorded in the window since the print

Regime: risk-on

The regime is no alibi. A risk-on tape did not stop this stock falling 27.5% in a session, because the cause was company-specific and structural rather than macro. The mean analyst target of $5.79 predates the guidance cut and no revisions have landed yet, so treat it as a number about to move rather than a number to lean on.

Risk Analysis

Risk Profile: High

The balance sheet is not the risk. The revenue line is, and the reason it is falling was decided in a Google policy document rather than in a Taboola boardroom.

Google made the decline permanent

Critical
  • On 13 April 2026 Google classified back-button interception as an explicit spam violation, in the same category as malware distribution. Enforcement began 15 June.
  • That killed Explore More, a session-depth product Taboola had sold to publishers for years, which served sponsored content to users pressing the back button.
  • Cost: more than $20M of ex-TAC gross profit in the second half of 2026. Management stated ex-TAC would have exceeded the top of guidance without it.
  • There is no indication the product will be rebuilt in a compliant form. Treat the loss as permanent until told otherwise.
Probability
Impact
Already occurred. The question is no longer whether it happens but whether $20M is the full extent of it.

Earnings quality, not earnings level

High
  • First-quarter GAAP net income of $59.1M included a $77M gain from a settlement in which Taboola was the plaintiff, agreed 5 February 2026 and booked in other income.
  • The settlement was larger than the entire GAAP profit reported for that quarter. Non-GAAP net income was $17.2M.
  • The trailing price/earnings ratio of 9.97 rests on a twelve-month window containing that gain. It will not repeat.
  • The forward ratio of 5.70 is computed against management's non-GAAP net income guidance of $168–176M, which excludes share-based compensation.
Probability
Impact
The cheapness is largely an artefact of two non-recurring or non-GAAP constructions. This is the single most important thing to understand before buying the multiple.

Buybacks outrunning cash generation

Medium
  • Free cash flow fell 49.3% to $17.3M in the second quarter; operating cash flow fell 34.1% to $31.3M.
  • The company repurchased $41.5M of shares in that same quarter, roughly 2.4x the free cash flow generated.
  • First-half repurchases total $64.2M, funded from a balance sheet holding $133.1M of cash.
  • Shares bought during the first half were bought around $4.50 to $5.00. They are worth $3.89 today.
Probability
Impact
Sustainable for a while given net cash, but it is capital return financed by the balance sheet rather than by operations, and so far it has destroyed value.

The publisher purge is unfalsifiable for now

Medium
  • Taboola exited publisher relationships failing its advertiser-success standards, more aggressively in Q2 than in prior periods.
  • A $12.169M non-cash write-off of publisher prepayments was recorded.
  • Management expects the cleanup to depress 2026 revenue and improve longer-term results. No revenue figure for the removed inventory was disclosed.
  • Foreign exchange took a further $7.5M off second-quarter adjusted EBITDA and is expected to persist.
Probability
Impact
Possibly good management. Also a convenient container for revenue that left for other reasons. Undisclosed sizing means it cannot be checked until the comparisons lap.

Positioning was ahead of the news

High
  • Apollo Management Holdings GP, a 10% owner, sold 12,000,000 shares at $4.40 on 28 May, retaining 18,039,644.
  • No insider bought a single share on the open market in 180 days.
  • Short interest rose from 4,036,802 shares (2.95% of float) on 13 February to 8,839,134 (6.46%) by 15 July.
  • A plaintiff law firm has published an investor investigation notice following the fall. This is a solicitation typical after a sharp drop, not a regulatory action, and should not be confused with one in either direction.
Probability
Impact
Nothing here is proof of foreknowledge. All of it is a reminder that the largest informed holder reduced at a materially higher price.

Dilution risk is genuinely low

Low
  • No S-3 shelf registration, prospectus supplement, equity line or warrant issuance in the last 180 days.
  • The most recent S-3 was filed 28 February 2024, more than two years ago.
  • Roughly $61M of net cash on the 10-Q figures: $133.1M against a $72.0M revolver draw.
  • The company is retiring shares, not issuing them, apart from the February executive grant of 5,536,181 shares.
Probability
Impact
The one part of this file that is unambiguously clean. At a $4 share price that is rarer than it should be.

Risk Synthesis

There is a useful distinction between a company that is cheap and a company whose share price has fallen. Taboola is both, but not for the same reason. The share price fell because revenue guidance was cut and the third quarter is now guided to shrink. The stock looks cheap because of a price/earnings ratio built on a courtroom settlement and a non-GAAP forward estimate. Those are two different statements, and conflating them is how value traps recruit. The honest way to own this is to underwrite the 2027 revenue line, not the multiple. Running the fundamentals through five threshold-based investor screens makes the split explicit, and it is worth doing twice. Fed the vendor's published figures, four of the five screens read bearish. Fed the corrected numbers — price-to-book of 1.11 rather than 1.53, and the 10-Q's $133.1M of cash against $72.0M of debt rather than the feed's roughly-net-zero — two flip to bullish and the panel moves to neutral. The deep-value tests now pass comfortably: balance sheet, book value, enterprise value against cash flow. The quality tests still fail, and they fail on the things that decide the next two years, namely a 29.7% gross margin against a 40% bar, an operating margin that is negative on a trailing basis, and return on equity of 11.2% against a 15% bar. Cheap on assets, weak on the business. That is the whole file in one line, and it is also why the grade is C+ rather than B or D.

Trade Idea

Entry Zone
$3.89
Spot, quoted as a reference level rather than a buy order. This map is drawn downward, for readers already holding the stock and for anyone tempted to catch the falling knife. It is not a recommendation to short a company sitting on net cash.
Stop Loss
$4.16
6.9% adverse — a daily close above the 5 August high kills the map
Target 1
$3.52
9.5% lower
Target 2
$2.83
27.1% lower
Risk/Reward
1:1.4 to the first target, 1:3.9 to the second
Through the 4 November print

Thesis

Price sits 20.5% below a 20-day average of $4.892 that now acts as resistance, with the 50-day stacked six-tenths of a percent below it. Beneath, there is almost nothing: the 5 August low at $3.5199 is the only tested floor before the 52-week low at $2.835, and with an average true range of $0.3206, roughly 8.2% of the share price, one ordinary session covers most of that gap. The map dies cleanly on a daily close above $4.16, which would take out the 5 August high and the $4.1202 that capped 6 August, and would say sellers have stopped setting the price. Be clear about what the first leg is worth: 1.4 to 1 is thin, and the whole reason to draw this is the second leg, where the 52-week low comes back into range if 4 November brings a third guidance cut. The counterweight is genuine and should temper any short: roughly $61M of net cash, an active buyback and no dilution machinery mean this does not go to zero on a bad quarter, it goes to a lower multiple.

Catalysts

  • Third-quarter results on 4 November 2026. Read the revenue line first, against the $460–473M guide, then check whether the full-year number was cut a third time.
  • Any disclosure quantifying the revenue removed by the publisher purge, which would make the strategy checkable instead of merely stated.
  • Analyst revisions, which have not yet landed. The $5.79 mean target predates the guidance cut.
  • Continued repurchases at these levels. Every dollar spent at $3.89 retires more stock than the same dollar did during the first half, when the shares traded between roughly $3.44 and $5.29.

Invalidation

  • A daily close above $4.16 takes back the 5 August high and ends this map. Holders who cut into that move were still right to cut; the map simply stops paying.
  • Third-quarter revenue at or above the $473M top of guidance on 4 November, with no further cut to the full year, would say the de-rating overshot and put $4.86 back in range.
  • Evidence that the publisher purge is genuinely finished and quantified, which would make the 2027 revenue line underwritable instead of a guess.
  • A buyback large enough to change the share count materially at these prices, funded by operations rather than the cash pile.

Global Score

C+ Post-earnings de-rating with a clean balance sheet Neutral

Key Takeaways — Positive

  • Roughly $61M net cash, no shelf, no equity line, no warrants in 180 days, and a $64.2M first-half buyback.
  • Enterprise value recomputed at spot is $1.00–1.06B against $228–240M of guided adjusted EBITDA, or 4.3x to 4.5x.
  • Ex-TAC gross profit and adjusted EBITDA guidance were genuinely raised while margins expanded.

Key Takeaways — Risks

  • The trailing price/earnings ratio of 9.97 sits on a window containing a $77M one-off legal settlement.
  • Third-quarter revenue is guided to fall 6.1% year over year, 10% below consensus, because Google banned the mechanic behind one of Taboola's products.
  • Free cash flow halved to $17.3M while $41.5M went on buybacks, and the largest holder sold 12 million shares at $4.40 in May.

Mindset Tip

When a company's press release leads with a metric you had never heard of before reading it, find the metric it replaced. Here the headline raised ex-TAC gross profit guidance, and the line it displaced was revenue, cut by up to $110M in the same document.

Disclaimer

This analysis is provided for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute financial advice, investment recommendation, or solicitation to buy or sell any security.

Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk, including the possible loss of principal. Always conduct your own research and consult a licensed financial advisor before making investment decisions.

Data sourced from real-time market data, Yahoo Finance, SEC EDGAR, and public market data. Accuracy is not guaranteed.

Verdict Business Fundamentals Earnings Insiders Capital Technical Risks Trade Score