Two numbers do the work here. Taboola's trailing price/earnings ratio is 9.97, and its first-quarter GAAP net income was $59.1M, of which $77M came from a legal settlement where the company was the plaintiff. The settlement was larger than the entire quarterly profit it sat inside. Strip it out and the cheap trailing multiple stops existing. The forward multiple of 5.70 is computed against management's own non-GAAP net income guidance of $168M to $176M, a figure that excludes share-based compensation in a year when four executives received 5,536,181 shares in a single February grant. Meanwhile the second quarter produced $4.3M of GAAP net income on $476.8M of revenue, and $0.01 per share against $0.04 expected. So no, this is not a profitable company trading at five times earnings. It is a company whose reported profitability has been flattered, now guiding revenue to shrink 6.1% year over year in the third quarter because Google reclassified one of its products as spam. The discount is deserved. What is not deserved is the assumption that the business is broken: on the 10-Q figures Taboola holds $133.1M of cash against $72.0M drawn on a revolver, roughly $61M of net cash, with no shelf offering, no equity line and no warrants in 180 days.
Taboola runs the recommendation widgets that sit under news articles on the open web, the boxes captioned Around the Web or You May Also Like. Publishers install the code, Taboola fills the slots with sponsored links, and the two sides split the money. The share paid away to publishers is traffic acquisition cost, which is why the company reports ex-TAC gross profit rather than revenue as its preferred measure. Incorporated in 2006, headquartered in New York, roughly 2,000 employees, classified by the exchange under Internet Content & Information.
That structure explains most of what happened on 5 August. Revenue is the gross number before publishers are paid, so it moves with the volume of inventory Taboola controls. Ex-TAC gross profit moves with the economics of each impression. In the second quarter those two lines separated: revenue grew 2.4% to $476.8M while ex-TAC gross profit grew 11.8% to $192.4M. Management chose the second number for the headline of its press release, which read Raises Full-Year ex-TAC Gross Profit and Adjusted EBITDA Guidance. Both raises were real. In the same document, full-year revenue guidance was cut by up to $110M against consensus.
The company is also in the middle of deliberately shrinking itself. It exited publisher relationships that did not meet its standards for advertiser results, more aggressively in the second quarter than before, and wrote off $12.169M of publisher prepayments as a non-cash charge. Management expects the purge to depress 2026 revenue and improve results later. That is a defensible strategy and an unfalsifiable one, at least until the numbers arrive.
Three figures did not reconcile across sources during this review, and readers should know which version they are getting. First, enterprise value. The market data feed reports $1,419,862,400. Rebuild it from its parts at today's price and you get $1,063,231,744 of market capitalisation plus $151,584,000 of debt less $150,275,008 of cash, or $1,064,540,736. The $355M gap is not a rounding issue: back out the market capitalisation implied by the published figure and it corresponds to a share price near $5.19, which is essentially the $5.2899 close of 4 August. The published enterprise value still reflects the pre-crash price. The same feed's price-to-book ratio of 1.53 corroborates it: against a stated book value of $3.497 that implies a $5.345 share price, when the stock is $3.89 and the honest ratio is 1.11. Every multiple on this page is recomputed at spot, which is why you see 4.3x to 4.5x rather than the 10.5x the feed reports.
Second, cash and debt. The feed reports $150.3M of cash and $151.6M of debt, implying net debt of roughly zero. The 10-Q for the quarter ended 30 June reports $133.1M of cash and $72.0M drawn on a revolving credit facility, implying about $61M of net cash. The likeliest explanation for the debt gap is that the feed capitalises operating leases. This page uses the filing figures and shows both. Third, share count. Reported shares outstanding of 243,284,708 multiplied by $3.89 gives $946M, not the $1.063B market capitalisation quoted, which implies roughly 273M shares. Taboola has both ordinary and non-voting ordinary shares, and repurchases cover both, so the ordinary count understates the total. Ranges are used rather than false precision.
One more, smaller: the feed reports short interest at 5.64% of float, but 8,839,134 shares against its own stated float of 136,848,037 is 6.46%. The arithmetic wins. And a wire story published before the open on 5 August described the stock as down 9.5% to $4.79; the settled session closed at $3.835 from $5.2899, a fall of 27.5%. The daily bars are the record used here.
| Segment | Revenue | % Total | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex-TAC gross profit | $192.4M (Q2) | 40% | Revenue net of what publishers are paid. Grew 11.8% year over year, the metric management guides on. |
| Traffic acquisition cost | $284.4M (Q2) | 60% | The publisher share of revenue, derived as revenue less ex-TAC gross profit. Roughly 60 cents of every revenue dollar. |
| Metric | Value | Signal |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue (Q2 2026) | $476.8M | +2.4% YoY, missed by 4.5% |
| Revenue guidance (Q3) | $460–473M | -6.1% YoY |
| Revenue guidance (FY26) | $1.930–1.956B | Cut from $2.03B |
| Ex-TAC gross profit (Q2) | $192.4M | +11.8% YoY |
| Adjusted EBITDA (Q2) | $55.5M | +22.8% YoY |
| GAAP net income (Q2) | $4.3M | $0.01/share vs $0.04 expected |
| Q1 2026 GAAP net income | $59.1M | Includes $77M one-off |
| Operating cash flow (Q2) | $31.3M | -34.1% YoY |
| Free cash flow (Q2) | $17.3M | -49.3% YoY |
| Cash (30 June 2026) | $133.1M | 10-Q figure |
| Total debt | $72.0M | Revolver draw |
| Net cash | ≈ $61M | Recomputed |
| Enterprise value (recomputed) | $1.00–1.06B | Not $1.42B |
| EV / adj. EBITDA (FY26 guide) | 4.3–4.5x | Recomputed at spot |
| Book value per share | $3.497 | P/B 1.11x at spot |
| Buyback (H1 2026) | $64.2M | Ordinary + non-voting |
| Quarter | EPS Actual | EPS Est. | Surprise | Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q2 2025 | $0.10 | $0.08 | +15.6% | - |
| Q3 2025 | $0.11 | $0.09 | +24.6% | - |
| Q4 2025 | $0.27 | $0.18 | +50.3% | - |
| Q1 2026 | $0.06 | $0.04 | +70.0% | - |
| Q2 2026 | $0.01 | $0.04 | -75% | $476.8M |
Four consecutive beats, then a miss. The streak ended on 5 August with $0.01 against $0.04 expected on a GAAP basis, and revenue 4.5% short. — Next: 4 November 2026
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-28 | Apollo Management Holdings GP (10% owner) | sell | 12,000,000 | $52.8M at $4.40 |
| 2026-05-08 | Monica Mijaleski (Director) | sell | 61,000 | $307,440 at $5.04 |
| 2026-05-07 | Kristy Sundjaja (Chief People Officer) | sell | 40,878 | $204,390 at $5.00 |
| 2026-02-27 | Singolda, Walker, Maniv, Sundjaja | grant | 5,536,181 | $19.0M at $3.44 |
Zero open-market purchases in 180 days. The only figure that matters is Apollo's: 12,000,000 shares at $4.40 on 28 May, leaving 18,039,644 held, ten weeks ahead of a print that took the stock 27.5% lower in a session. Note that the aggregate insider feed lists this sale twice; the identical post-transaction holding on both lines confirms one transaction, not two. Everything else in the window is either a share award, an option exercise or tax withholding, none of which are purchases or sales of conviction.
Share count is falling, not rising. $64.2M of repurchases in the first half, roughly 14M shares at prevailing prices, partly offset by the 5,536,181-share executive grant in February. The last S-3 registration statement was filed on 28 February 2024.
More than doubled in five months, from 4,036,802 shares and 2.95% of float on 13 February
Unusual Activity: Implied volatility of 144% on the $5 call and 172% on the $7.50 call, against open interest of 511 and 575 contracts. Read nothing into the 4.77 call/put ratio: with 1,316 contracts of total open interest across the expiry, this book is too thin to carry information. Anyone citing it as bullish positioning is quoting noise.
| RSI (14) | 29.3 |
| EMA 20 | $4.89 |
| EMA 50 | $4.86 |
| EMA 200 | $4.23 |
| MACD | -0.157 |
| Signal | -0.021 |
| ATR (14) | $0.32 |
The trend broke in one session. On 4 August the stock closed at $5.2899; on 5 August it closed at $3.835 on 9,255,600 shares, a 27.5% fall on roughly three times the following day's volume. Price now sits 20.5% below its 20-day exponential average at $4.892, with the 50-day at $4.8617 stacked within six-tenths of a percent of it. That cluster is overhead resistance now, and it is a long way overhead. The relative strength index at 29.3 is oversold, which in a trend this damaged means very little on its own: oversold readings mark exhaustion in uptrends and merely describe the damage in downtrends. What matters more is the empty space beneath. The 5 August low at $3.5199 is the only tested floor between here and the 52-week low at $2.835, and the average true range of $0.3206 is 8.2% of the share price, so a single ordinary session covers most of the distance to that floor.
| Indicator | Value | Signal |
|---|---|---|
| Market regime | Risk-on, 54.1% confidence | Supportive but not decisive |
| 5-day transition to risk-off | 16.9% early risk-off, 8.0% crisis | A quarter of the distribution is defensive |
| August seasonality (5y) | -0.19% average daily return | Mildly negative |
| Analyst mean target | $5.79 | Stale — no upgrades or downgrades recorded in the window since the print |
Regime: risk-on
The regime is no alibi. A risk-on tape did not stop this stock falling 27.5% in a session, because the cause was company-specific and structural rather than macro. The mean analyst target of $5.79 predates the guidance cut and no revisions have landed yet, so treat it as a number about to move rather than a number to lean on.
The balance sheet is not the risk. The revenue line is, and the reason it is falling was decided in a Google policy document rather than in a Taboola boardroom.
There is a useful distinction between a company that is cheap and a company whose share price has fallen. Taboola is both, but not for the same reason. The share price fell because revenue guidance was cut and the third quarter is now guided to shrink. The stock looks cheap because of a price/earnings ratio built on a courtroom settlement and a non-GAAP forward estimate. Those are two different statements, and conflating them is how value traps recruit. The honest way to own this is to underwrite the 2027 revenue line, not the multiple. Running the fundamentals through five threshold-based investor screens makes the split explicit, and it is worth doing twice. Fed the vendor's published figures, four of the five screens read bearish. Fed the corrected numbers — price-to-book of 1.11 rather than 1.53, and the 10-Q's $133.1M of cash against $72.0M of debt rather than the feed's roughly-net-zero — two flip to bullish and the panel moves to neutral. The deep-value tests now pass comfortably: balance sheet, book value, enterprise value against cash flow. The quality tests still fail, and they fail on the things that decide the next two years, namely a 29.7% gross margin against a 40% bar, an operating margin that is negative on a trailing basis, and return on equity of 11.2% against a 15% bar. Cheap on assets, weak on the business. That is the whole file in one line, and it is also why the grade is C+ rather than B or D.
Price sits 20.5% below a 20-day average of $4.892 that now acts as resistance, with the 50-day stacked six-tenths of a percent below it. Beneath, there is almost nothing: the 5 August low at $3.5199 is the only tested floor before the 52-week low at $2.835, and with an average true range of $0.3206, roughly 8.2% of the share price, one ordinary session covers most of that gap. The map dies cleanly on a daily close above $4.16, which would take out the 5 August high and the $4.1202 that capped 6 August, and would say sellers have stopped setting the price. Be clear about what the first leg is worth: 1.4 to 1 is thin, and the whole reason to draw this is the second leg, where the 52-week low comes back into range if 4 November brings a third guidance cut. The counterweight is genuine and should temper any short: roughly $61M of net cash, an active buyback and no dilution machinery mean this does not go to zero on a bad quarter, it goes to a lower multiple.
When a company's press release leads with a metric you had never heard of before reading it, find the metric it replaced. Here the headline raised ex-TAC gross profit guidance, and the line it displaced was revenue, cut by up to $110M in the same document.
This analysis is provided for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute financial advice, investment recommendation, or solicitation to buy or sell any security.
Past performance is not indicative of future results. All investments involve risk, including the possible loss of principal. Always conduct your own research and consult a licensed financial advisor before making investment decisions.
Data sourced from real-time market data, Yahoo Finance, SEC EDGAR, and public market data. Accuracy is not guaranteed.